Contracts
Not deployed yet. ArcadeFun targets Sonic, chain ID 146. The contracts below are written and tested against live Sonic state; when they are deployed their addresses go in this table, each verified on Sonicscan so the code behind the link is the code that runs. Until then, any address presented as one of these is not.
| contract | address |
|---|---|
PairLaunchpad | not deployed |
FeeVault | not deployed |
QuoteRegistry | not deployed |
CompositeQuoteGate | not deployed |
UniV3QuoteGate (Uniswap V3) | not deployed |
UniV3QuoteGate (SpookySwap V3) | not deployed |
ShadowQuoteGate | not deployed |
V2QuoteGate | not deployed |
PairZap | not deployed |
Buying with S: PairZap
A coin here trades against another coin, so someone holding only S has two trades to make. PairZap
makes them as one transaction: an aggregator's route between S and the pair asset (LI.FI's router,
fixed at deployment), then the coin's own Uniswap V3 pool. You sign a single minimum that bounds both;
if either leg falls short the whole transaction reverts and you keep what you had.
It has no owner and no settings, holds nothing between trades, and keeps no allowance standing. Its swap callback pays only the pool of a swap it started, only while that swap is in flight. It is a convenience, not a gate: the pool is an ordinary Uniswap V3 pool, and anything that can trade one can trade your coin without it. It has not been audited.
The protocol coin
There is no protocol coin yet. When there is, it will be launched through PairLaunchpad like any
other coin — same fixed supply, same locked liquidity, same contract code — and its address will be
published here first.
Your coin's own contract
Every coin launched here is a PairToken, and every one of them will show as verified without
anyone submitting it. That is not a courtesy — PairToken takes no constructor arguments (it calls
back into the launchpad for its name, symbol and supply), so the creation bytecode is byte-identical
every time. Once one instance is verified, the explorer matches all the others, including coins that
do not exist yet.
What that verified source says, and what it therefore cannot do: fixed supply set once in the constructor, no mint function, no transfer tax, no blacklist, no pause, no owner.
External contracts it uses
Every one of these was read off Sonic before it was written down (22 September 2026) — the factories
through their own interface, the tokens by symbol, name and decimals, the feeds by
description, and Uniswap's periphery by asking each contract for its factory().
Calls worth knowing
Before launching
// Non-reverting. Returns whether it would be allowed, and why not if not.
registry.status(address quote)
returns (bool eligible, Decision decision, Report report)
// The bar this particular asset has to clear — $5,000 if listed, $10,000 if not.
registry.requiredDepthUsdE8(address quote) returns (uint256)
Launching
launchpad.launch(LaunchConfig cfg) payable returns (address token, address pool)
launchpad.predictToken(address creator, bytes32 salt) returns (address)
launchpad.launchFee() returns (uint256)
LaunchConfig carries, beyond the obvious:
| field | what it does |
|---|---|
lpFee / tickSpacing | the pool's fee tier, in hundredths of a bip, and the tick spacing the factory fixes for it. Only tiers inside minLpFee..maxLpFee — 0.3% and 1% — and both ticks multiples of the spacing |
creatorBps | share of supply kept back for you, capped at 20% |
feeRoute | 0 keeps your fees, 1 buys the coin back and burns it, 2 pays your holders |
feeRecipient | zero means the launching wallet |
devBuyQuote | pair-asset amount spent buying your own coin as the pool's first trade; needs an approval to the launchpad first |
devBuyMinOut | least you will accept from that buy — nobody can front-run it, so this guards against you and the pool disagreeing on the opening price |
After launching
// Anyone can call. Proceeds only ever reach the recorded recipient, the sink and the treasury.
feeVault.collect(address token)
// Creator only. Both take effect from the next collect.
feeVault.setFeeRoute(address token, FeeRoute route)
feeVault.setFeeRecipient(address token, address recipient)
// Reads
launchpad.launchOf(address token) // a public mapping: an unnamed tuple
feeVault.launchOf(address token) returns (Launch) // includes the pool address
feeVault.positionOf(address token) returns (liquidity, owed0, owed1)
feeVault.feeRouteOf(address token) returns (FeeRoute)
feeVault.feeRecipientOf(address token) returns (address)
feeVault.owed(address token, address who) returns (uint256) // a payout that could not be pushed
feeVault.claim(address token) // collect one
Where the liquidity lock actually lives
There is no lock contract and no locked LP token. A Uniswap V3 position only becomes an NFT when
Uniswap's position manager wraps it; underneath it is a slot in the pool keyed by
(owner, tickLower, tickUpper), and the fee vault minted into that slot directly, paying the pool
in its mint callback. The usual "liquidity locked" detectors look for LP tokens or position NFTs
sent to a burn address or a locker, and here there is nothing of the sort for them to find.
What holds instead is a property of FeeVault, and with its source published you can check it
rather than believe it: no code path in the vault ever calls burn with a non-zero amount.
Collecting fees calls burn with exactly zero — which only moves earned fees into the position's
tokensOwed — and then collect. There is no withdraw, no emergency exit, and no owner function
that adds one. Anyone can read the position with pool.positions(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(feeVault, tickLower, tickUpper))). The float cannot come back out — not by the creator, not by us.
Owner powers
The owner can retune the depth bars, the fee bounds, the launch fee, the treasury, the buyback sink, the curated list, the gates and their parameters. It cannot touch a launch's liquidity, change an existing launch's creator share, or redirect a creator's fees.
Ownership transfer is two-step everywhere: a handover that is never accepted leaves the current owner in place rather than sending the protocol to a wrong address.
The deploy scripts make the owner a single EOA. It should be a multisig behind a timelock, and the contracts do not enforce that themselves.
None of this has been audited.